The Evolution of Juvenile Justice From the Book of Leviticus to Parens Patriae: The Next Step After In re Gault by McInnis, Donald E. et al.
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 
Volume 53 Number 3 Article 1 
Spring 5-1-2020 
The Evolution of Juvenile Justice From the Book of Leviticus to 
Parens Patriae: The Next Step After In re Gault 
Donald E. McInnis 
Shannon Cullen 
Julia Schon 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr 
 Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, Juvenile Law Commons, Law and 
Society Commons, and the Social Welfare Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Donald E. McInnis, Shannon Cullen & Julia Schon, The Evolution of Juvenile Justice From the Book of 
Leviticus to Parens Patriae: The Next Step After In re Gault, 53 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 553 (2020). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola 
Marymount University and Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law 
Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. 
For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu. 
(6) 53.3_MCINNIS (DO NOT DELETE) 6/8/2020 3:40 PM 
 
553 
THE EVOLUTION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 
FROM THE BOOK OF LEVITICUS TO PARENS 
PATRIAE: THE NEXT STEP AFTER IN RE 
GAULT 
Donald E. McInnis,* Shannon Cullen** & Julia Schon*** 
          Since the arrival of the Pilgrims, American jurisprudence has 
known that its law-breaking children must be treated differently than 
adults. How children are treated by the law raises ethical and 
constitutional issues. This Article questions the current approach, which 
applies adult due process protections to children who are unable to fully 
understand their constitutional rights and the consequences of waiving 
those rights. The authors propose new Miranda warnings and a Bill of 
Rights for Children to protect children and their constitutional right to 
due process under the law. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The United States Supreme Court, through its decision in 
Miranda v. Arizona,1 requires criminal suspects to be warned of their 
Fifth Amendment rights before being interrogated.2 In doing so, it 
created certain safeguards to ensure the police do not coerce 
incriminating statements from suspects.3 First among those safeguards 
are the right to legal counsel and the right against self-incrimination.4 
But how those rights are advised and waived by suspects has produced 
a long history of judicial decisions. This is particularly true when it 
comes to juvenile suspects. 
The Supreme Court has decided more cases regarding the 
interrogation of juveniles than any other aspect of the juvenile justice 
system.5 Over the years, the Court has questioned whether juvenile 
suspects have the legal and psychological capacities to understand 
their constitutional rights, and whether they have the ability to 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive those rights when 
questioned by adults.6 Although the Court has cautioned trial judges 
in regard to the immaturity of minors and minors’ inability to invoke 
or waive their Miranda rights, the Court has not mandated any special 
procedural protections for juveniles.7 Instead, it has applied the adult 
standard of review by looking, after the fact, at the totality of the 
circumstances surrounding the waiver of the minors’ Miranda rights.8 
Today, the overwhelming weight of scientific evidence shows 
that the mind of a juvenile is insufficiently developed to fully 
understand the ramifications of Miranda warnings.9 Accordingly, the 
 
 1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 2. Id. at 444–45. 
 3. Id. at 437. 
 4. Id. at 442. 
 5. Barry C. Feld, Juveniles’ Competence to Exercise Miranda Rights: An Empirical Study of 
Policy and Practice, 91 MINN. L. REV. 26, 27 (2006). 
 6. See Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 661–68 (2004); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 
707, 727–28 (1979); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 52–55 
(1962); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 598–601 (1948). 
 7. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 277 (2011); In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 55; see also 
Claire Chiamulera, Juvenile’s Age is a Factor in Miranda Custody Analysis, AM. B. ASS’N (July 1, 
2011), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_interest/child_law/resources/child_law_ 
practiceonline/child_law_practice/vol30/july_2011/juvenile_s_age_isafactorinmirandacustodyana
lysis/ (discussing J.D.B. v. North Carolina). 
 8. Fare, 442 U.S. at 725. 
 9. See Thomas Grisso, Juveniles’ Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights: An Empirical 
Analysis, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 1134, 1152 (1980); Laurence Steinberg, Should the Science of 
Adolescent Brain Development Inform Public Policy?, 50 CT. REV. 70, 70 (2014). 
(6) 53.3_MCINNIS (DO NOT DELETE) 6/8/2020  3:40 PM 
556 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:553 
time has come to consider stronger protections for minors when they 
come in contact with the authorities. This is particularly true when 
minors are subjected to a custodial interrogation. The toll on youths 
and their families, as well as on the judicial system, can no better be 
demonstrated than by the cold hard fact that thousands of minors have 
been exonerated following convictions based on false confessions—
an exoneration rate three times that for adults.10 
The predominant cause of this woeful rate of false confessions is 
the lack of safeguards to protect minors’ inability to understand the 
meaning of a Miranda admonishment and the consequences of 
forgoing their constitutional rights. Only with a heightened level of 
security provided to juveniles, beginning with their first contact with 
police and through questioning and arrest, can society avoid repeating 
the mistakes of the past. 
This Article provides a review of the development of juvenile 
rights from the time of the earliest colonists to the requirement of due 
process for minors defined by In re Gault,11 and the current post-In re 
Gault era. Proposed are new, simplified Miranda warnings for 
children and a Children’s Bill of Rights. It is hoped that, through these 
reforms, the rights promised to juveniles by In re Gault will be 
fulfilled. 
II.  FIRST JUVENILE EXECUTION 
The first documented juvenile execution in North America was 
that of Thomas Granger, age sixteen.12 Thomas was “cast by . . .  jury 
and condemned, and after executed” in Plymouth Colony, on 
September 7, 1642,13 for a crime of the biblical ages: “if a man lie with 
a beast, he shall surely be put to death: and ye shall slay the beast.”14 
The matter of Thomas Granger first arose when a witness reported to 
 
 10. New Study Finds False Confessions More Likely Among Juveniles, INNOCENCE PROJECT 
(Oct. 22, 2013), https://www.innocenceproject.org/new-study-finds-false-confessions-more-
likely-among-juveniles/. 
 11. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 12. History of the Juvenile Death Penalty, WASH. POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
archive/lifestyle/wellness/1988/07/19/history-of-the-juvenile-death-penalty/d2ebf62e-3c6f-4f9b-
b673-d6d607e0154a/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2020). 
 13. Id.; see WILLIAM BRADFORD, BRADFORD’S HISTORY “OF PLIMOTH PLANTATION”: FROM 
THE ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPT 475 (Boston, Wright & Potter Printing Co. 1898); Crime and 
Punishment in Plymouth Colony, MayflowerHistory.com, http://mayflowerhistory.com/crime (last 
visited Feb. 23, 2020). 
 14. Leviticus 20:15 (King James); see BRADFORD, supra note 13, at 475 (citing Leviticus 
20:15). 
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the colony’s elders that the young man had sex with a mare.15 Since 
the Puritan Separatists first arrived in New England in 1620, the law 
of this new plantation was a mix of the biblical and English common 
laws.16 Justice was administered by individual church congregations 
and later by chosen elders.17 
As the taking of a life for a crime, including a sexual crime, was 
a major ethical and legal question, the elders of Plymouth Plantation 
sought the advice of their most respected leaders and clergy. The 
discussion that the reverend elders of the colony had is recounted in 
the writing of William Bradford, leader of the Pilgrims18 and governor 
of the colony intermittently for nearly thirty years.19 
Three questions were posed to the elders in March 1642: 
1. Was the act of bestiality a capital crime which required a 
death sentence? 
2. Is one witness, plus a confession from the accused admitting 
his crime, sufficient to convict in a case of a capital crime? 
3. How far may a magistrate go to extract a confession from a 
youth in a case of a capital crime?20 
On the first two questions, elders John Reynor, Ralph Partrich, 
and Charles Channcy concluded bestiality was a crime against nature 
and God, punishable by death, as set forth in Leviticus 20:15.21 But 
they felt one witness was not sufficient, absent other confirming 
evidence.22 They did agree, however, that one witness, plus a 
confession from the accused admitting he had participated in the 
“unnaturall and unclainnes” of bestiality, was sufficient for a judgment 
of death.23 However, there was much discussion on the question of: 
“[H]ow farr a magistrate may extracte a confession from a delinquente 
 
 15. BRADFORD, supra note 13, at 474–75. 
 16. Christopher Fennell, Plymouth Colony Legal Structure, PLYMOUTH COLONY ARCHIVE 
PROJECT (Dec. 14, 2007), www.histarch.illinois.edu/plymouth/ccflaw.html. 
 17. Id.; Plymouth Colony, ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM (Dec. 7, 2019), 
https://www.encyclopedia.com/history/united-states-and-canada/us-history/plymouth-colony; see 
also Rebecca Beatrice Brooks, History of Plymouth Colony, HIST. MASS. BLOG (Sept. 28, 2016), 
https://historyofmassachusetts.org/plymouth-colony-history/; Plymouth Colony Drafts the First 
Laws in North America, NEW ENG. HIST. SOC’Y, http://www.newenglandhistoricalsociety.com/ 
plymouth-colony-drafts-first-laws-north-america-1636 (last updated 2017). 
 18. BRADFORD, supra note 13, at 472–73. 
 19. Plymouth Colony, supra note 17. 
 20. BRADFORD, supra note 13, at 464–74. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 466. 
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to acuse him selfe of a capital crime, seeing Nemo tenetur prodere 
seipsum.”24 
The Church of England separatists who fled to the new world 
were very familiar with persecutions by the English Crown25 and the 
tactics of the Spanish Inquisition.26 Therefore, the elders agreed 
caution should be taken so that “no one is bound to incriminate or 
accuse himself” falsely.27 All three elders questioned the use of torture 
and even the administration of an oath to God when questioning a 
youth.28 The elders concluded: 
[H]e [magistrate] may not extracte a confession of a capitall 
crime from a suspected person by any violent means, whether 
it be by an oath imposed, or by any punishmente inflicted or 
threatened to be inflicted, for so he may draw forth an 
acknowledgmente of a crime from a fearfull inocente . . . .29 
So, the elders specifically ruled out torture as a means to extract 
a confession. And, they felt asking the youth to swear to tell the truth 
when charged with a capital crime would also produce no trustworthy 
confession.30 Instead, the elders concluded: 
A magistrate is bound, by carfull examination of 
circumstancces & weighing of probabilities, to sifte ye 
accused, and by force of argumente to draw him to an 
acknowledgement of ye truth.31 
Elder Charles Channcy ended his written remarks on how a magistrate 
should question a youth with this: 
 
 24. Id. at 465–72 (emphasis added). Nemo tenetur prodere seipsum is Latin for “no one is 
bound to incriminate or accuse themselves.” Nemo Tenetur Prodere Seipsum Law and Legal 
Definition, U.S. LEGAL, https://definitions.uslegal.com/n/nemo-tenetur-prodere-seipsum (last 
visited Feb. 23, 2020). 
 25. History.com Editors, Plymouth Colony, HISTORY (last updated Aug. 20, 2019), 
https://www.history.com/topics/colonial-america/Plymouth; Plymouth Colony, supra note 17. 
 26. The Story of the Pilgrims II: The Leyden Years, MILLS, MCLAUGHLIN, RADLOFF & RUTH 
FAMILY PAGES, http://www.millsgen.com/gen/hist/pilstor2.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2020) (“If 
Spain renewed the war and re-took the Netherlands, it would bring with it the terrifying Spanish 
Inquisition, whose task it was to search out and destroy all forms of dissent against the Roman 
Catholic church.”); see also Who Were the Pilgrims?, PLIMOTH PLANTATION, 
https://www.plimoth.org/learn/just-kids/homework-help/who-were-pilgrims (last visited Feb. 23, 
2020) (“To make matters worse, the congregation worried that another war might break out 
between the Dutch and Spanish.”). 
 27. Nemo Tenetur Prodere Seipsum Law and Legal Definition, supra note 24. 
 28. BRADFORD, supra note 13, at 464–74. 
 29. Id. at 467. 
 30. Id. at 465–67, 472–73. 
 31. Id. at 467. 
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The Lord in mercie directe & prosper Ye desires of his 
servants that desire to walk before him in truth & 
righteousness in the administration of justice, and give them 
wisdome and largnes of harte.32 
In a private meeting with the magistrate, Thomas at first denied 
the charges, but, after continued questioning, he confessed to his crime 
of bestiality.33 There is no record of what the magistrate said to the 
young man.34 Thus, we do not know how the magistrate weighed the 
probabilities or circumstances of Thomas Granger’s denials. Most 
importantly, we do not know if the magistrate told the youth he had to 
confess if he ever expected to walk before God where “truth & 
righteousness prevails.”35 
But the magistrate’s record does state that Thomas confessed to 
having sex with a mare, a cow, two goats, five sheep, two calves, and 
a turkey.36 Thomas again confessed to his crimes in open court to a 
jury.37 Given the witness’s statement and Thomas’s confession, a 
sentence of death was pronounced.38 The animals involved were 
slaughtered in front of Thomas and buried in a large pit.39 No part of 
them was allowed to be consumed by humans.40 Thomas was then 
hanged.41 
Thomas Granger, like so many other minors, was tried under 
adult law.42 But he was the only minor put to death in Plymouth 
Colony for a sexual crime.43 It is interesting to note that, nearly four 
hundred years ago, the issue about what is permissible when 
 
 32. Id. at 474. 
 33. Id. at 475. 
 34. Id. at 474–75. 
 35. Id. at 474. 
 36. Id. at 474–75. 
 37. Id. at 475. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. To read the original transcript of Governor Bradford’s diary, see BRADFORD, supra 
note 13. 
 42. Alexandra Wilding, Juvenile Justice System Stems from 1899 Illinois Law, CUMBERLAND 
TIMES-NEWS (June 1, 2011), https://www.times-news.com/news/local_news/juvenile-justice-
system-stems-from-illinois-law/article_a8065591-44a4-5b65-aa2a-bbbbed931e02.html; see 
Plymouth Colony Drafts the First Laws in North America, supra note 17 (“From the colonial period 
through most of the 1800s, children beyond the ‘age of reason,’ usually age 7, were held to adult 
standards of behavior,” being tried under adult laws, and for the most part, sentenced as adults). 
 43. Plymouth Colony Drafts the First Laws in North America, supra note 17. 
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questioning a youth about a crime was heavily debated by those in 
authority in Plymouth Colony. 
III.  WESTWARD HO 
As the colonies grew, settlers moved across the Appalachian 
Mountains into the Appalachian Plateaus and the Adirondacks, in a 
great migration westward that did not stop until the settlers reached 
the Pacific Ocean.44 In this migration west, justice for the settlers was 
formed by the harsh environments of the land, diseases, hostile Native 
Americans, isolated living conditions, the lack of organized law, and 
the need for swift, individual justice.45 Often times, talion law 
prevailed:46 
And if any mischief follow, then thou shalt give life for life, 
eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, 
burning for burning, wound for wound, stripe for stripe.47 
Most of the time, there was no trial. Rather, justice was dispensed 
by gun or hanging as determined by those present or by vigilante 
mobs.48 In San Francisco, public trials were staged outdoors and often 
resulted in public corporal punishment and executions.49 
California, more than any other western territory, attracted 
thousands of immigrants from all over the world with the discovery of 
gold on January 24, 1848.50 At the signing of the Treaty of Guadalupe 
Hidalgo, which ended the Mexican-American War on February 2, 
1848, the population of the California territory was approximately 
6,500 Californios, people of Spanish or Mexican decent; 700 
 
 44. History.com Editors, Westward Expansion, HISTORY (last updated Sept. 30, 2019), 
https://www.history.com/topics/westward-expansion/westward-expansion. 
 45. Carleton W. Kenyon, Legal Lore of the Wild West: A Bibliographical Essay, 56 CALIF. L. 
REV. 681, 686–99 (1968); see also GEORGE D. LANGDON, JR., PILGRIM COLONY: A HISTORY OF 
NEW PLYMOUTH 1620–1691 93 (1966) (“different circumstances” in the hazardous territory made 
“rigid adherence to English law” less impelling). 
 46. “Talion, Latin lex talionis, principle developed in early Babylonian law and present in 
both biblical and early Roman law that criminals should receive as punishment precisely those 
injuries and damages they had inflicted upon their victims. Many early societies applied this ‘eye-
for-an-eye’ principle literally.” Talion, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/talion (last visited Feb. 23, 2020). 
 47. Exodus 21:23–25 (King James); see also Talion, supra note 46. 
 48. 1800–1860: Law and Justice: Overview, ENCYLOPEDIA.COM (last updated Dec. 2, 2019), 
https://www.encyclopedia.com/history/news-wires-white-papers-and-books/1800-1860-law-and-
justice-overview. 
 49. Id. 
 50. The California Gold Rush, PBS: THE GOLD RUSH (Sept. 13, 2006), 
http://www.shoppbs.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/goldrush/peopleevents/e_goldrush.html. 
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foreigners, primarily American; and 150,000 Native Americans.51 In 
1846, the population of San Francisco was barely 200.52 By the end of 
1848, San Francisco and the surrounding area had a non-Native-
American population of over 100,000.53 By the height of the gold rush 
in 1850, the total population in California was 200,000, of which 
180,000 were men and 20,000 were women.54 This gender imbalance 
brought thousands of single women from all over the world who were 
seeking not only their fortune, but also mates in a state with an 
abundance of men.55 
Some of the innocent victims of this California migration were 
the neglected, abandoned, and illegitimate children whose parents 
died, abandoned them, or could not control them due to the harsh 
conditions of life.56 When possible, these wayward children were 
cared for by relatives, neighbors, churches, orphan societies, and later, 
state-run homes.57 However, large numbers of young children were 
found begging, wandering the streets in the company of thieves and 
prostitutes, or frequenting dance halls, saloons, or any other place that 
might provide temporary comfort, food, and shelter.58 Left alone to 
fend for themselves, these children became a burden and a threat to 
the communities they lived in.59 This was especially true in the gold-
crazed city of San Francisco, which had a fast-growing population of 
 
 51. Id. 
 52. San Francisco Population, SFGENEALOGY: SAN FRANCISCO HISTORY, 
https://www.sfgenealogy.org/sf/history/hgpop.htm (last updated Jan. 5, 2018). 
 53. Id. 
 54. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE 
UNITED STATES, COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970 25 (1975). 
 55. Nancy J. Taniguchi, Weaving a Different World: Women and the California Gold Rush, 
CAL. HIST., Summer 2000, at 141, 143; History.com Editors, California Gold Rush, HISTORY  
(last updated Aug. 29, 2019), https://www.history.com/topics/westward-expansion/gold-rush-of-
1849. 
 56. Diane Nunn & Christine Cleary, From the Mexican California Frontier to Arnold-
Kennick: Highlights in the Evolution of the California Juvenile Court, 1850–1961, 5 J. CTR. FAM., 
CHILD. & CTS. 3, 6–10 (2004); see also Daniel Macallair, The San Francisco Industrial School and 
the Origins of Juvenile Justice in California: A Glance at the Great Reformation, 7 U.C. DAVIS J. 
JUV. L. & POL’Y 1, 2 (2003); Unknown Author, Untitled Article, DAILY DRAMATIC CHRONICLE, 
Dec. 4, 1865, at A1. 
 57. Nunn & Cleary, supra note 56, at 3–6; see also Juvenile Court Law §§ 8–9, 1909 CAL. 
STAT. 213–16. 
 58. Inauguration of the Industrial School Address by Colonel J.B. Crockett, S.F. DAILY 
BULL., May 17, 1859, at 1; Macallair, supra note 56, at 13; Unknown Author, Untitled Article, 
DAILY DRAMATIC CHRON., Dec. 4, 1856, at A1. 
 59. THOMAS J. BERNARD, THE CYCLE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 60 (1992). 
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children under the age of fifteen.60 How to manage these youthful 
offenders plagued local authorities. 
IV.  CHILDREN AS ADULTS 
The problems San Francisco and its charitable societies faced can 
be found in the newspapers of the time: 
John Murphy, a thirteen-year-old hoodlum, who spends half 
his time in the clutches of the police, stabbed a boy in the 
Everett House yesterday during a quarrel. . . . Young 
Murphy fled, but was soon afterward caught by the police 
and locked up in the City Prison charged with assault with 
intent to commit murder.61 
Another of the boy criminals . . . is a gawky, dirty faced little 
youngster . . . 15 years old. He looks about 10 years. Judge 
Smith obviously don’t know what to do with an infant 
charged with a crime [stealing a bicycle] punishable by 
imprisonment in the penitentiary. He ordered the case 
postponed.62 
One wonders what eventually happened to these particular 
children and the hundreds like them. At the time, children who 
committed serious crimes were tried under adult laws and 
consequently sentenced to jail or prison along with adult men.63 In the 
late 1850s, the California Prison Committee reported that San Quentin 
State Prison, an adult facility, housed over 300 boys, some as young 
as twelve years old.64 The report listed an additional 600 children 
confined in adult jails throughout the state.65 
 
 60. Macallair, supra note 56, at 12 (1860 census: number of San Francisco children under 15 
were 12,116; 1867 census: number of San Francisco children under 15 were 34,710). 
 61. A Boy Stabber, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 18, 1888, at 3; Angus Macfarlane, History of 
California’s Juvenile Court, ch. 33, at 7 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
 62. Boy Criminal: He Perplexes Court, L.A. DAILY TIMES, May 15, 1903, at 2; Macfarlane, 
supra note 61, at 12. 
 63. EDWIN M. LEMERT, SOCIAL ACTION & LEGAL CHANGE: REVOLUTION WITHIN THE 
JUVENILE COURT 33 (1970); Juvenile Justice History, CTR. JUV. & CRIM. JUST., 
http://www.cjcj.org/Education1/Juvenile-Justice-History.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2020). 
 64. Macallair, supra note 56, at 24 (citing California Youth Authority, The History of Juvenile 
Detention in California and the Origins of the California Youth Authority 1850–1980 39–41 (1981) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the California Youth Authority in Sacramento, CA)). 
 65. Id. (citing California Youth Authority, supra note 64). 
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V.  PARENS PATRIAE 
In the later part of the 1800s, a widespread disillusionment 
developed with the practice of jailing children with adults and the 
maltreatment of children by supposed enlightened reform schools. 
Movements sprang up demanding that children not be prosecuted 
under adult criminal laws and delinquency be treated in more humane 
ways.66 Judge Ben Lindsey of Colorado was one of the first judges to 
establish a way to treat children differently than adults.67 At first, the 
Denver judge used both probation and the state’s truancy laws of 1899 
to keep children in school rather than sending them to jail or reform 
schools.68 Later, he used the ancient common law doctrine of parens 
patriae69 to assert jurisdiction over children, not as criminals, but as 
“Civil Wards of the State” in need of correction.70 
The concept of parens patriae, where the state steps in civilly and 
not criminally when dealing with juvenile delinquency, raised a 
theoretical question about how the state may deprive children of their 
liberty. As time went on, many states, courts, and scholars argued that 
judges should have unlimited scope and power over juvenile 
delinquents.71 They theorized that “the child is not entitled, either by 
the laws of nature or of the State, to absolute freedom, but is subjected 
to the restraint and custody of a natural or legally constituted guardian 
to whom it [the child] owes obedience and subjection.”72 Thus, the 
 
 66. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14–16 (1967); LEMERT, supra note 63, at 34–35; Nunn & Cleary, 
supra note 56, at 10–12. 
 67. Nunn & Cleary, supra note 56, at 10–12; see also Judge Benjamin Barr Lindsey (1869–
1943), DENVER PUB. LIBRARY: GENEALOGY, AFRICAN AM. & WESTERN HIST. RESOURCES, 
https://history.denverlibrary.org/colorado-biographies/judge-benjamin-barr-lindsey-1869-1943 
(last visited Feb. 23, 2020).   
 68. Paul Colomy & Martin Kretzmann, Projects and Institution Building: Judge Ben B. 
Lindsey and the Juvenile Court Movement, 42 SOC. PROBS. 191, 197 n.1 (1995). 
 69. Parens patriae is Latin for “parent of his or her country,” the power of the state to act for 
those who are unable to care for themselves, such as the public policy of the state to act as the 
parent of any child who needs protection. Parens Patriae, CORNELL L. SCH.: LEGAL INFO. INST., 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/parens_patriae (last visited Feb. 23, 2020). 
 70. CHARLES LARSEN, THE GOOD FIGHT 28–29 (1972); Nunn & Cleary, supra note 56, at 11; 
see also Judge Benjamin Barr Lindsey (1869–1943), supra note 67 (describing Judge Lindsey’s 
biography). 
 71. James E. Duffy, Jr., In re Gault and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Juvenile 
Court, 51 MARQ. L. REV. 68, 70 (1967). 
 72. Id. 
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theory of parens patriae granted the nation’s judges nearly absolute 
power when dealing with juvenile delinquency.73 
As the theory of parens patriae started to be applied to juveniles, 
the state of Illinois passed the Juvenile Court Act, creating the first 
juvenile court and probation system for children in the nation.74 This 
legislation provided a civil law model where children were treated not 
as criminals, but as youths in need of reform. The Illinois system was 
soon duplicated throughout the nation.75 
A.  Individualized Juvenile Justice 
Throughout this time, California law was developing. While of 
English common law in origin, the California justice system had a 
unique Western-Spanish influence through the concept of the Mexican 
alcaldes, where local elders administered justice in a paternalistic and 
benevolent, if not dictatorial, manner.76 This form of justice fit well 
with the old west tradition of personal self-reliance and stubborn 
individuality.77 However, at the time, individualized justice meant that 
treatment or punishment was dispensed depending on who a person 
was, whether they had committed an offense before, and the type of 
offense they were now charged with.78 
One judge in 1910 summarized the role of parens patriae in 
California’s juvenile justice system as follows: 
I sincerely trust no attempt will be made to prescribe the 
exact processes that the court should follow in these 
[juvenile] cases. The legislature should lay down the 
essentials which are to govern. That ground has generally 
 
 73. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14–17 (1967). This would be the state of juvenile law until Kent 
v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966), and In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 74. Nunn & Cleary, supra note 56, at 11–12. 
 75. David S. Tanenhaus, The Evolution of Juvenile Courts in the Early Twentieth Century: 
Beyond the Myth of Immaculate Construction, in A CENTURY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 42, 42–46 
(Margaret K. Rosenheim et al. eds., 2002); Nunn & Cleary, supra note 56, at 11–12. 
 76. DAVID J. LANGUM, LAW AND COMMUNITY ON THE MEXICAN CALIFORNIA FRONTIER: 
ANGLO-AMERICAN EXPATRIATES AND THE CLASH OF LEGAL TRADITIONS, 1821–1846 37–40 
(1987) (explaining that these local mayors or judges ruled as they saw fit, undeterred by legal 
precedents or standards); WILLIAM J. PALMER & PAUL P. SELVIN, THE DEVELOPMENT OF LAW IN 
CALIFORNIA 3–13 (1983). 
 77. Nunn & Cleary, supra note 56, at 1. 
 78. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 7–9 (“The penalty specified in the Criminal Code [of Arizona], 
which would apply to an adult, is $5 to $50, or imprisonment for not more than two months.”). 
Fifteen-year-old Gault, who was on probation for assisting another boy steal a wallet out of a purse, 
was sentenced to the State Industrial School for the period of his minority (that is, until twenty-
one), unless sooner discharged by due process of law. See id. at 4. 
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been covered . . . beyond that the legislature should not 
circumscribe the exercise of judicial authority in these 
cases.79 
B.  Denial of Constitutional Rights 
As the juvenile courts applied the civil doctrine of parens patriae, 
constitutional rights guaranteed to adults were unnecessary for 
children because the state was acting civilly in the best interest of the 
child.80 “These results were to be achieved, without coming to 
conceptual and constitutional grief, by insisting that the proceedings 
were not adversary, but that the state was proceeding as parens 
patriae.”81 It should be noted that the phrase parens patriae was taken 
from English common law, wherein the state acts in loco parentis for 
the purpose of protecting the property interests and the person of a 
child.82 However, there is no history of the parens patriae doctrine in 
English criminal law.83 The use of the doctrine in juvenile criminal 
cases was a legal fiction created in an effort to decriminalize juvenile 
delinquency.84 
Because the courts relied on individualized justice, the courts’ 
treatment of juveniles was uncoordinated and inconsistent. Thus, two 
boys could be treated differently when committing the same criminal 
act due to the child’s history, prior encounters with the law, or family 
circumstances.85 In California, punishment for crimes was also treated 
 
 79. LEMERT, supra note 63, at 41; Nunn & Cleary, supra note 56, at 16. 
 80. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 15–16; STEVEN L. SCHLOSSMAN, LOVE AND THE AMERICAN 
DELINQUENT: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF “PROGRESSIVE” JUVENILE JUSTICE, 1825–1920 10, 
31–38 (1977); Janet Friedman Stansby, In Re Gault: Children Are People, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 1204, 
1207 (1967); Monrad G. Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 MINN. L. REV. 547, 549 
(1957); see, e.g., In re Holmes, 109 A.2d 523, 525 (Pa. 1954); Paul W. Alexander, Constitutional 
Rights in the Juvenile Court, in JUSTICE FOR THE CHILD: THE JUVENILE COURT IN TRANSITION 82, 
90–91 (Margaret Keeney Rosenheim ed., 1962); Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. 
REV. 104, 109–10 (1910). 
 81. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 16. 
 82. Id. 
 83. TIMOTHY D. HURLEY, ORIGIN OF THE ILLINOIS JUVENILE COURT LAW 320, 328 (3d ed. 
1907); Paulsen, supra note 80, at 548–49 (1957). 
 84. See BRADFORD, supra note 13, at 464–74; Judge Benjamin Barr Lindsey (1869–1943), 
supra note 67; Duffy, supra note 71, at 69 n.3 (arguing that the philosophy of parens patriae through 
individual justice was undoubtedly a backlash from the pre-1899 treatment of children in adult 
criminal courts). 
 85. Duffy, supra note 71, at 69. 
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differently from county to county.86 This emphasis on individualized 
justice by a benevolent, parent-like state was stressed in juvenile 
courts to the point where due process was ignored and, many times, 
justice denied.87 
Through the years, due process for juveniles in California was 
completely circumvented by the courts.88 For example, in Ex parte Ah 
Peen,89 the California Supreme Court ruled that a sixteen-year-old boy 
who was “leading an idle and dissolute life” in San Francisco and 
whose parents were unknown should be sent to a state school for 
children until he was reformed or reached legal adulthood.90 Even 
though confinement was ordered, this ruling was handed down 
without a jury trial because the purpose was not to punish the child for 
any criminal behavior but to reform and train him.91 
The California Supreme Court reiterated this philosophy of 
juvenile law in its 1924 decision In re Daedler92 when it denied a jury 
trial to a fourteen-year-old accused of murder.93 The court stated that 
“[t]he processes of the Juvenile Court Law are, as we have seen, not 
penal in character, and hence said minor has no inherent right to a trial 
by jury.”94 
VI.  IN RE GAULT: A REVOLUTION IN JUVENILE LAW 
In 1965, the Arizona Supreme Court, in denying a writ of habeas 
corpus filed by the parents of fifteen-year-old Gerald Gault, 
summarized the then-philosophy many juvenile court systems 
throughout the United States believed in and followed: 
[J]uvenile courts do not exist to punish children for their 
transgressions against society. The Juvenile court stands in 
the position of a protecting parent rather than a prosecutor. It 
is an effort to substitute protection and guidance for 
 
 86. LEMERT, supra note 63, at 61 (noting that drinking, fighting or sexual experimentation 
may be overlooked, while damaging ranch equipment or stealing cattle could elicit a strong, 
punitive reaction). 
 87. See In re Holmes, 109 A.2d 523, 535 (Pa. 1954); LANGUM, supra note 76, at 30–31. 
 88. Juvenile Court Law §§ 8–9, 1915 CAL. STAT. 1231–32; In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 1 (1967); 
LEMERT, supra note 63, at 31–32. 
 89. 51 Cal. 280 (1876). 
 90. Id. at 281. 
 91. Id. 
 92. 228 P. 467 (Cal. 1924). 
 93. Id. at 472. 
 94. Id. But see Ex parte Becknell, 51 P. 692 (Cal. 1897). 
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punishment, to withdraw the child from criminal jurisdiction, 
and use social science regarding the study of human behavior 
which permit flexibilities within the procedures. The aim of 
the court is to provide individualized justice for children.95 
On December 6, 1966, the United States Supreme Court heard the 
appeal of the Gaults from the Arizona Supreme Court ruling.96 In 
appealing the Arizona court’s rulings, the Gaults challenged the 
philosophy of both parens patriae and individualized justice by 
claiming such juvenile processes violated their Fourteenth 
Amendment rights.97 
The United States Supreme Court upheld the philosophy of 
parens patriae by accepting the entire premise of the juvenile court 
model—juveniles were delinquents, not criminals; juveniles should be 
reformed, not criminally punished; juvenile proceedings were civil in 
nature; and the juvenile courts are not open to the public so as to 
protect the child’s delinquent acts from the public98—but the Supreme 
Court did not accept the premise that these benefits could only be 
preserved if juvenile offenders were not afforded due process rights.99 
The Supreme Court firmly rejected the argument that introducing due 
process rights for children would prevent the juvenile courts from 
performing their quasi-parental function of protecting and reforming 
the child.100 
The Supreme Court found such rationalization unconstitutional 
and determined children are persons protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment when accused of crimes in a delinquency proceeding.101 
As such, youthful offenders must be given many of the same due 
process rights as adults. Accordingly, the Court went on to require 
certain criminal trial procedures as part of a juvenile’s due process 
rights. These due process rights included: (1) the right to legal counsel; 
(2) the privilege against self-incrimination (i.e., children do not have 
to admit charges or testify against themselves); (3) the right to 
confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses and the evidence; 
(4) the right to notice of the charges and all hearings; (5) the right to 
 
 95. In re Gault, 407 P.2d 760, 765 (Ariz. 1965), rev’d, In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 96. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1. 
 97.  Id. at 10. 
 98. Id. at 11 n.7, 22–27, 31 n.48. 
 99. Id. at 30–31. 
 100. Id.  
 101. Id. at 41. 
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transcripts of all proceedings; and (6) the right to appellate review.102 
The most significant of these six was the right to counsel. For the first 
time, juvenile courts were required to allow defense attorneys in the 
adjudication of delinquency proceedings and, through the other 
enumerated due process rights, the ability to mount a defense to the 
charges. 
A.  Due Process Incomplete 
While In re Gault signaled a new approach to delinquency 
proceedings, the constitutional rights of children have not always been 
protected to the same extent as the courts protect adult rights. This is 
because juvenile courts still grapple with their dual charge of 
protecting the community while at the same time acting in the best 
interest (parens patriae) of youths. As a consequence, in some states, 
juveniles can waive their right to legal counsel. For example, in 
Maryland, Louisiana, Florida, Ohio, and Kentucky, more than half of 
the children waive their right to counsel, and these waivers are 
accepted by the court.103 But can a youth waive the right to counsel 
and fully understand the consequences of such a waiver, especially at 
sentencing? In adult court, “judges are reluctant to grant a waiver of 
counsel unless the accused understands the nature of the charge and 
its statutory requirements, the range of punishments, the possible 
defenses and circumstances of mitigation, and other facts necessary to 
defend against the charges.”104 The question of whether youthful 
offenders can understand their constitutional rights, knowingly waive 
those rights, and fully comprehend the nature of a police investigation, 
the meaning of their own interrogation, and the consequence of being 
arrested, tried, and sentenced in juvenile court, reveals a fundamental 
flaw in the way children are treated in the criminal justice system.105 
B.  Due Process and Juvenile Interrogation 
In In re Gault, the Supreme Court questioned the ability of a child 
in juvenile court proceedings to comprehend and knowingly waive his 
 
 102. Id. at 41–59. 
 103. Cheryl D. Wills, Right to Counsel in Juvenile Court 50 Years After In re Gault, 45 J. AM. 
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 140, 142 (2017) (citing Wallace J. Mlyniec, In re Gault at 40: The Right 
to Counsel in Juvenile Court—A Promise Unfulfilled, 44 No. 3 CRIM. L. BULL. Art. 5, 1, 7 (2008)). 
 104. Id.; see In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 41–42. 
 105. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 36–37 (right to counsel); id. at 55–57 (right to confrontation, 
cross-examination, and self-incrimination); Wills, supra note 103, at 142. 
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or her constitutional rights.106 The same must also be asked regarding 
a child’s ability to understand and knowingly waive those same rights 
when being questioned by the police. The Supreme Court in In re 
Gault further questioned the veracity of juvenile confessions by 
quoting Dean Wigmore: 
[B]ased on ordinary observation of human conduct, that 
under certain stresses a person, especially one of defective 
mentality or peculiar temperament, may falsely acknowledge 
guilt. This possibility arises wherever the innocent person is 
placed in such a situation that the untrue acknowledgment of 
guilt is at the time the more promising of two alternatives . . 
. .107 
Further, the Supreme Court held that one of the purposes of the 
right against self-incrimination was to prevent the state, “whether by 
force or by psychological domination, from overcoming the mind and 
will of the person under investigation and depriving that person of the 
freedom to decide whether to assist the state in securing their 
conviction.”108 The Court went on to find: 
Due process of law is the primary and indispensable 
foundation of individual freedom. It is the basic and essential 
term in the social compact which defines the rights of the 
individual and delimits the powers which the state may 
exercise.109 
Justice Douglas stated, “Neither man nor child can be allowed to 
stand condemned by methods which flout the constitutional 
requirements of due process of law.”110 Applying such constitutional 
standards to interrogation, the Court said, “It is frequent practice that 
rules governing the arrest and interrogation of adults by the police are 
not observed in the case of juveniles.”111 Why is this? It is our belief 
that there is a parental urge in all of us that dictates how we as adults 
approach children, in particular when a child appears to have gone 
astray. 
 
 106. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 41–42, 55–56. 
 107. Id. at 44–45 (quoting 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 822 (3d ed. 1940)). 
 108. Id. at 47; see also Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540–41 (1961) (convictions based 
on involuntary confessions “cannot stand”). 
 109. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 20; see also id. at 20 n.26 (discussing impact of denying due 
process to juveniles). 
 110. Id. at 13 (emphasis added) (quoting Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 601 (1948)). 
 111. Id. at 14. 
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C.  The Role of Parens Patriae Post In re Gault 
Many are of the belief that, when juveniles confess to a criminal 
act, they are not incriminating themselves since no criminal conviction 
may result in juvenile court. Indeed, most children also hold this belief 
not knowing that they may be tried as adults in many instances. This 
is nothing more than a continuing belief in the practice of parens 
patriae when dealing with juveniles. Others believe that confessing is 
good for the soul and is the first step toward reformation, an important 
part of juvenile justice. Accordingly, the refusal to admit one’s wrongs 
indicates that the child does not understand his or her antisocial 
behavior and needs further reform, which again is a reflection of the 
parens patriae theory.112 However, despite these beliefs, history has 
shown that “confessing” oftentimes yields problematic results for 
juveniles. 
In In re Gault, the Arizona juvenile court took the young fifteen-
year-old boy from his family and committed him to a state school 
simply because he made an obscene phone call to a female 
neighbor.113 In Kent v. United States,114 a sixteen-year-old boy was 
arrested for burglary and rape.115 He was interrogated for a day and a 
half and, ultimately, admitted to participating in the crimes.116 The 
juvenile court waived jurisdiction and remitted the boy to adult court 
for trial where the boy’s confession was used to convict.117 
In the summer of 1989, five juveniles confessed to raping and 
beating a New York woman.118 Later called “the Central Park Five,” 
these youths were tried as adults and convicted based on their 
confessions.119 The police were criticized for the tactics they used to 
elicit the confessions. The defense argued to the courts that the 
juveniles did not understand their right to remain silent or their right 
to an attorney, and consequently, they unknowingly waived their 
 
 112. See Gilbert T. Venable, The Parens Patriae Theory and Its Effect on the Constitutional 
Limits of Juvenile Court Powers, 27 PITT. L. REV. 894, 910 (1966). 
 113. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 4. 
 114. 383 U.S. 541 (1966). 
 115. Id. at 543. 
 116. Id. at 543–44. 
 117. Id. at 551. 
 118. Sharon L. Davies, The Reality of False Confessions—Lessons of the Central Park Jogger 
Case, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 209, 216–17 (2006). 
 119. Selwyn Raab, Central Park Case Puts Focus on Tough Juvenile Law, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 15, 1989, at B1. 
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Miranda rights.120 Eventually, the convictions were overturned when 
another man confessed to the attack and his confession was confirmed 
through DNA evidence.121 
In 1998, in the matter of Crowe v. County of San Diego,122 teams 
of police continuously interrogated three fourteen-year-old boys for 
over eight hours throughout the night regarding the murder of Michael 
C.’s twelve-year-old sister.123 During a juvenile court hearing to 
determine the suitability of the boys for juvenile court treatment, the 
confessions elicited by the police were, in part, allowed and 
disallowed due to violations of Fifth Amendment warning 
requirements.124 All three boys were ordered to stand trial as adults for 
murder.125 As one of the boys’ trials was commencing, DNA testing 
found the deceased girl’s blood on a vagrant’s clothing.126 The charges 
against the boys were dropped, and the vagrant was tried for the girl’s 
murder.127 The three boys were later found by a judge to be “factually 
innocent” of the murder.128 Although found innocent, the three 
nevertheless had to suffer through their teen years under the specter of 
being involved in a murder. These cases, like so many others, raise the 
issue of the ability of juveniles to knowingly waive their constitutional 
rights when questioned by the police or other state authorities. 
The United States Supreme Court has explicitly highlighted the 
vulnerability of juveniles when dealing with the criminal justice 
system. In Haley v. Ohio,129 Justice Douglas wrote: 
Age 15 is a tender and difficult age for a boy of any race. He 
cannot be judged by the more exacting standards of maturity. 
That which would leave a man cold and unimpressed can 
overawe and overwhelm a lad in his early teens. This is the 
period of great instability which the crisis of adolescence 
produces. A 15-year-old lad, questioned through the dead of 
 
 120. Davies, supra note 118, at 216–19. 
 121. Karen Freifield, A 2002 Report on the Central Park 5 Convictions Being Overturned, 
AMNY, https://www.amny.com/news/central-park-five-1-32018864/ (Dec. 20, 2002). 
 122. 608 F.3d 406 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 123. Id. at 417. 
 124. Id. at 425. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 417. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Teri Figueroa, Escondido: Michael Crowe and Friend ‘Factually Innocent,’ Judge Says, 
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (May 22, 2012, 11:44 AM), https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/ 
sdut-escondido-michael-crowe-and-friend-factually-2012may22-story.html. 
 129. 332 U.S. 596 (1948). 
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night by relays of police, is a ready victim of the 
inquisition.130 
In 1962, the Supreme Court reiterated its position in regard to 
juveniles’ ability to waive their constitutional rights in Gallegos v. 
Colorado:131 
[A fourteen-year-old boy] cannot be compared with an adult 
in full possession of his senses and knowledgeable of the 
consequences of his admissions. He would have no way of 
knowing what the consequences of his confession were 
without advice as to his rights—from someone concerned 
with securing him those rights—and without the aid of more 
mature judgment as to the steps he should take in the 
predicament in which he found himself. . . . Adult advice 
would have put him on a less unequal footing with his 
interrogators. Without some adult protection against this 
inequality, a 14-year-old boy would not be able to know, let 
alone assert, such constitutional rights . . . . To allow this 
conviction to stand would, in effect, be to treat him as if he 
had no constitutional rights.132 
The United States Supreme Court has, for over seventy years, 
recognized the inability of children to understand their constitutional 
rights and make a knowing and intelligent waiver of those rights. Yet, 
the courts still allow the police to admonish children of their Miranda 
rights and then proceed, through deceit, intimidation, and 
psychological manipulation, to extract confessions from their hapless 
victims. The justification for allowing such an abuse of constitutional 
rights is that the courts prefer to look at the totality of the 
circumstances surrounding the interrogations in determining whether 
the confessions are reliable.133 
 
 130. Id. at 599. 
 131. 370 U.S. 49 (1962). 
 132. Id. at 54–55. Gallegos, age fourteen, and another juvenile followed an elderly man to a 
hotel room where they assaulted him and stole thirteen dollars. Arrested later, Gallegos, after being 
held five days without seeing an attorney, parent, or any other friendly adult, confessed. In juvenile 
court he was sentenced to the state industrial school. After the sentencing, the elderly victim died. 
Gallegos was charged with first-degree murder and tried as an adult. His confession, made and 
signed before the victim died, was used in adult court to convict him. Id. at 49–50. 
 133. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 44–46 (1967) (discussing confessions and citing Dean Wigmore 
on the necessity to examine the conditions surrounding the confession to determine its 
trustworthiness). 
(6) 53.3_MCINNIS (DO NOT DELETE) 6/8/2020  3:40 PM 
2020] THE EVOLUTION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 573 
VII.  THE INTERSECTION OF JUVENILE 
DEVELOPMENT AND DUE PROCESS 
When a person doesn’t understand his or her Miranda rights, 
those rights have no meaning.134 
By the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the 
twenty-first century, multiple disciplines, including neuroscience, 
psychology, and sociology, came to a conclusion that Aristotle and 
subsequent generations of parents, scholars, and societies had known 
for centuries: adolescents are less able to control themselves and are 
more prone to risk-taking compared to adults.135 But now these 
modern multiple disciplines had incontrovertible evidence that 
adolescence is a period of significant change in a youth’s brain 
structure and function, and a period of change in which the adolescent 
is extremely susceptible to peer or group pressure.136 
One of the most significant scientists in adolescent brain 
development is Laurence Steinberg. Through numerous studies, he has 
determined that there are four significant “structural” brain changes a 
youth experiences while going through adolescence: 
1. There is a decrease in gray matter in the prefrontal regions of 
the brain due to the elimination of unused neuron 
connections. This occurs mainly during pre-adolescence to 
early adolescence when children experience increases in basic 
cognitive abilities and reasoning.137 
2. In early adolescence, especially during puberty, there is a 
substantial increase in the amount of dopamine receptors, 
 
 134. Hum. Rts. Watch, You Have the Right to Remain Silent—California Bill Strengthens 
Miranda for Kids, YOUTUBE (Aug. 17, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z-
VW8Ldw6YI&t=30s (noting that children have “less capacity to understand their rights.”). 
 135. Steinberg, supra note 9, at 72. For examples of the different disciplines’ literature on the 
adolescent mind, see Alison S. Burke, Under Construction: Brain Formation, Culpability, and the 
Criminal Justice System, 34 INT’L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 381, 382–83 (2011); Eveline A. Crone & 
Maurits W. van der Molen, Developmental Changes in Real Life Decision Making: Performance 
on a Gambling Task Previously Shown to Depend on the Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex, 25 
DEVELOPMENTAL NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 251, 251–52 (2004); Jay N. Giedd, Structural Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging of the Adolescent Brain, ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI., June 2004, at 77, 83. 
 136. Steinberg, supra note 9, at 71; see also Marty Beyer, Recognizing the Child in the 
Delinquent, 7 KY. CHILD RTS. J. 16, 16–17 (1999) (discussing adolescent brain development and 
their inability to use advanced judgment under stress); Using Adolescent Brain Research to Inform 
Policy: A Guide for Juvenile Justice Advocates, NAT’L JUV. JUST. NETWORK (Sept. 2012), 
http://www.njjn.org/our-work/adolescent-brain-research-inform-policy-guide-for-juvenile-justice 
(discussing teens’ susceptibility to peer pressure “[b]ecause of the changes in the emotional and 
decision-making centers of the brain”). 
 137. Steinberg, supra note 9, at 70. 
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which connect the limbic system and prefrontal cortex, 
enhancing how humans experience pleasure, such as 
sensation seeking.138 
3. There is an increase in the nerve networks connecting brain 
regions, in particular a strengthening between the prefrontal 
cortex and limbic system. This increases communication 
between different brain systems. This process continues into 
late adolescence.139 
4. There is an increase in white matter that results in 
myelination, the process through which nerve fibers become 
sheathed in myelin, improving the efficiency of brain circuits. 
This increase in efficiency produces higher-order cognitive 
functions, such as planning ahead, risk versus reward 
analysis, and complicated decisions. This process continues 
into late adolescence and early adulthood.140 
Professor Steinberg also found, “Adolescence is not just a time of 
tremendous change in the brain’s structure. It is also a time of 
important changes in how the brain works.”141 He found three distinct 
changes in brain functions: 
1. During adolescence and into early adulthood, there is a 
strengthening of brain activity involving self-regulation. It 
appears a wider area of brain regions are used by adults, 
which makes self-control easier than during adolescence.142 
2. Brain scans show that adolescents’ reward centers are more 
active than in young children or adults. Anticipated rewards 
appear to motivate adolescents to engage in risky acts.143 This 
hypersensitivity is increased when in groups or with 
friends.144 
3. As the adolescent enters adulthood, there is an increase in the 
number of brain regions involved in response to arousing 
stimuli. Before adulthood, the adolescent has less cross talk 
 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 70–71. 
 143. Id. at 71; GIDEON YAFFE, THE AGE OF CULPABILITY: CHILDREN AND THE NATURE OF 
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 18 (2018). 
 144. Steinberg, supra note 9, at 71. 
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between brain systems that regulate rational decision-making 
and those that regulate emotional arousal.145 
Science has concluded that these structural and functional 
changes do not occur at the same time in all youths.146 Further, brain 
areas used in cognitive processing reach adult levels by mid-
adolescence, whereas brain self-regulation does not fully mature until 
late adolescence or even into early adulthood.147 “In other words, 
adolescents mature intellectually before they mature socially or 
emotionally.”148 
Although the understanding of how juvenile minds develop has 
progressed, the law has been slow to catch up. The United States 
Supreme Court has acknowledged that adolescents are not on the same 
“developmental playing field” as adults.149 However, despite this 
delayed “developmental playing field,” juveniles are read the same 
Miranda warnings as adults.150 Consequently, these warnings are 
often futile due to juveniles’ inability to understand and exercise these 
rights.151 It is no surprise that only about 10 percent of juvenile 
suspects invoke their Miranda rights152 compared to the 40 percent of 
adult suspects who invoke their rights.153 This low percentage for 
juveniles can likely be attributed to two factors: (1) juveniles fail to 
 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id.; Jason Chein et al., Peers Increase Adolescent Risk Taking by Enhancing Activity in 
the Brain’s Reward Circuitry, 14 DEVELOPMENTAL SCI. F1, F2 (2011). 
 147. Steinberg, supra note 9, at 71. 
 148. Steinberg, supra note 9, at 70–71; see also Adam Ortiz, Adolescence, Brain Development, 
and Legal Culpability, AM. B. ASS’N: JUV. JUST. CTR., Jan. 2004, at 1, 2–3;  Leah H. Somerville et 
al., A Time of Change: Behavioral and Neural Correlates of Adolescent Sensitivity to Appetitive 
and Aversive Environmental Cues, 72 BRAIN & COGNITION 124, 124–26 (2010) (“Common 
behavioral changes during adolescence may be associated with a heightened responsiveness to 
incentives and emotional cues while the capacity to effectively engage in cognitive and emotion 
regulation is still relatively immature.”). 
 149. Pamela Witmer, Statistically Speaking: Juveniles, Interrogation Techniques and 
Development: Do Law Enforcement Officers Really Understand the Adolescent Brain?, CHILD 
LEGAL RTS. J. 60, 60 (2011); see Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 553 (2005). 
 150. Lorelei Laird, Police Routinely Read Juveniles Their Miranda Rights, but Do Kids Really 
Understand Them?, AM. B. ASS’N. J. (June 1, 2016, 2:50 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/ 
magazine/article/police_routinely_read_juveniles_their_miranda_rights_but_do_kids_really_und. 
 151. Jamie Knight, When Miranda Misses Its Mark: A Proposal for Heightened Protections for 
Juvenile Interrogations, 31 CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J. 28, 30 (2011). 
 152. Thomas Grisso & Carolyn Pomicter, Interrogation of Juveniles: An Empirical Study of 
Procedures, Safeguards, and Rights Waiver, 1 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 321, 339 (1977); Richard Rogers 
et al., The Comprehensibility and Content of Juvenile Miranda Warnings, 14 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y 
& L. 63, 65 (2008). 
 153. Grisso & Pomicter, supra note 152. 
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comprehend the Miranda warnings themselves; and (2) juveniles fail 
to understand the dangers of waiving their Miranda rights. 
In the 1970s and 1980s, studies by Thomas Grisso looked at 
juvenile and adult comprehension of the Miranda warnings.154 Grisso 
found that only 20.9 percent of juveniles understood each of the four 
Miranda warnings.155 In contrast, about 42.3 percent of the adults 
understood the Miranda warnings.156 Additionally, even if juveniles 
understood the Miranda warnings, many were unable to effectively 
exercise these rights because “[j]uveniles [did] not fully appreciate the 
function or importance of [these] rights.”157 
In a study at the turn of the twenty-first century by Naomi E. 
Sevin Goldstein et al., comparisons were made to the earlier studies 
by Grisso.158 The more-recent testers found: 
Miranda comprehension in the early 21st century is similar 
to the levels of understanding of delinquent boys in the 
1970s. Despite speculation that youth are more 
knowledgeable about police interactions and Miranda rights 
than children 3 decades ago, this research suggests that 
adolescents’ Miranda comprehension has not significantly 
improved over time. This continuity across generations 
suggests that Miranda comprehension may be a 
developmental skill beyond the capacity of young 
adolescents.159 
Similarly, like the adolescents in the Grisso study three decades 
prior, juveniles in the Goldstein 2003 study did not know that they 
were entitled to speak with an attorney before questioning and have an 
attorney present during the interrogation.160 In addition, a similar 
percentage of youths “mistakenly believed that lawyers only 
protect[ed] the innocent and that the right to silence can be revoked at 
a later date by a judge.”161 Vocabulary played an important part in both 
survey results, with “interrogation” and “consult” being the most 
 
 154. See Grisso, supra note 9. 
 155. Id. at 1153. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Barry C. Feld, Behind Closed Doors: What Really Happens When Cops Question Kids, 23 
CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 395, 409–10 (2013). 
 158. See Naomi E. Sevin Goldstein et al., Juvenile Offenders’ Miranda Rights Comprehension 
and Self-Reported Likelihood of Offering False Confessions, 10 ASSESSMENT 359, 366 (2003).  
 159. Id. at 366. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
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commonly misunderstood words.162 Juveniles understood the word 
“interrogation” to have something to do with a court hearing, and 
“consultation” to mean a simple conversation.163 
In another recent study, researchers Richard Rogers, Lisa 
Hazelwood, and Kenneth Sewell concluded that the standard Miranda 
warnings are indeed far beyond the cognitive abilities of juveniles.164 
More specifically, the study concluded that juveniles thirteen years or 
younger cannot “grasp key Miranda components related to their right 
to an attorney or parental assistance.”165 The research found that to 
understand the word “right,” suspects must possess at least an eighth-
grade education.166 To understand the word “waive,” juvenile suspects 
must possess more than a high school education.167 Researchers also 
noted that, as a result of stress, a suspect’s comprehension level 
decreases by at least 20 percent during an interrogation.168 
Consequently, many juvenile suspects simply lack the comprehension 
skills required to fully understand the Miranda warnings being read to 
them.169 For juvenile suspects to meaningfully waive their rights, they 
must do so “knowingly.”170 Yet, the above research demonstrates that 
juveniles lack the ability to understand each right. Thus, it is 
questionable whether juveniles may even knowingly waive their 
Miranda rights—which demonstrates all the more the need to be 
assisted by legal counsel. Such a conclusion is significant since more 
than 1.5 million juveniles are arrested and Mirandized each year.171 
Moreover, along with an inability to understand Miranda rights, 
juveniles also face problems invoking their Miranda rights.172 In a 
study by Nicole Bracy, researchers looked at whether juveniles aged 
twelve to seventeen understood their Miranda rights and how 
juveniles perceived the interrogating officers.173 This study revealed 
that, along with a low understanding of legal vocabulary, “juveniles 
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 164. Rogers et al., supra note 152, at 75. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 72.  
 167. Id. at 78. 
 168. Laird, supra note 150. 
 169. See Rogers et al., supra note 152, at 75. 
 170. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966). 
 171. Rogers et al., supra note 152, at 63. 
 172. Brian Werner, Did They Ever Stand a Chance? Understanding Police Interrogations of 
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are not independently capable of understanding the consequences of 
waiving their Miranda warnings, and youth expressed overconfidence 
in being able to resist police pressure.”174 Not surprisingly, these 
results intensified as the juveniles’ age decreased.175 
Additionally, juveniles are taught from an early age to obey and 
answer authority figures.176 These social expectations leave juveniles 
in a vulnerable position because interrogators can easily persuade 
juveniles to waive their Miranda rights.177 Consequently, 
“[a]dolescents are more likely than young adults to make choices that 
reflect a propensity to comply with authority figures, such as 
confessing to the police rather than remaining silent.”178 
This trend is demonstrated in a 2003 study by Hayley M. D. 
Cleary. One thousand three hundred juveniles and young adults were 
asked to choose the best scenario for “a vignette character (among 
confessing to the offense, denying the offense, and refusing to 
speak).”179 Roughly half of the eleven- to thirteen-year-old juveniles 
indicated confession as the best option.180 However, the number of 
people picking confession declined considerably with age.181 
Ultimately, “Miranda warnings and waivers require sufficient 
ability to understand their constitutional protections and rationally 
apply them to waiver decisions at the pre-interrogation stage.”182 
Without a complete understanding of Miranda, children often waive 
these protections, which leaves their basic constitutional rights 
vulnerable.183 Despite the studies showing the underdeveloped 
juvenile brain and its inability to fully understand the Miranda 
warnings, juveniles are still provided the same Miranda warnings as 
adults—warnings that are wholly insufficient to protect juveniles’ 
constitutional rights. Without an adequate understanding of their 
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Miranda rights, juveniles consequently speak with law enforcement, 
subjecting themselves to challenging and deceptive interrogation 
techniques. 
A.  Interrogation Techniques of Juveniles 
One of the consequences of juveniles waiving their constitutional 
rights is they are subjected to police interrogation techniques, which 
even adults find challenging. Teenagers may appear adult-like because 
they have gone through puberty and have some adult features. But 
their brains still have years of developing to do before they will have 
the cognitive abilities to even understand the consequences of their 
actions.184 Nonetheless, interrogation techniques used on juveniles 
over the age of fourteen tend to mirror those used with adult 
suspects.185 
The use of adult interrogation techniques is likely the result of law 
enforcement’s misconception of juvenile mental development.186 
More specifically, one study found that law enforcement views 
juveniles similarly to adults in interrogation settings.187 Further, 
“police indicated that suspects of all ages understand their rights and 
intent of interrogations.”188 This misconception is problematic 
because children have a reduced ability to withstand coercive 
interrogation techniques—techniques that cause false confessions.189 
Researchers who study false confessions have concluded that the 
following factors play a role in or cause false confessions: 
• Real or perceived intimidation of the suspect by law 
enforcement; 
• Use of force by law enforcement during the 
interrogation or perceived threat of force; 
• Compromised reasoning ability of the suspect due to 
exhaustion, stress, hunger, substance use, and, in 
some cases, mental limitations or limited education; 
 
 184. Mariam Arain et al., Maturation of the Adolescent Brain, 9 NEUROPSYCHIATRIC DISEASE 
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 185. Werner, supra note 172, at 168. 
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• Devious interrogation techniques, such as untrue 
statements about the presence of incriminating 
evidence; and 
• Fear, on the part of the suspect, that failure to confess 
will yield a harsher punishment.190 
Such factors also adversely affect juveniles fourteen years or older.191 
A study by B. C. Feld found that the top five interrogation techniques 
used with juveniles included confronting the juvenile with evidence, 
accusing the juvenile of lying, presenting the juvenile with 
inconsistencies, compelling the juvenile to answer honestly, and 
questioning the juvenile with behavioral analysis interview 
questions.192 Ultimately, the researchers found that juveniles were 
subjected to the same coercive strategies and tactics used on adults 
during interrogations.193 
“While many adults often succumb to the pressure of 
interrogation, such tactics more often result in false confessions in 
juveniles due to their still-maturing psychological, emotional, and 
cognitive abilities.”194 For one, juveniles are particularly susceptible 
to suggestive questioning by authority figures.195 As a result, juveniles 
are more likely to adopt an inaccurate version of events during police 
interrogations.196 Additionally, juveniles fail to consider the long-term 
consequences of confessing to a crime because of their 
underdeveloped prefrontal cortex.197 This is especially “problematic 
in custodial interrogations because police often tell juveniles that, in 
order to go home, they must tell them what they want to hear.”198 Thus, 
a juvenile’s “eagerness to comply with adult authority figures, 
impulsivity, immature judgement, and inability to recognize and 
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weigh risks in decision-making” may lead them to falsely confess 
rather than consider the consequences.199 As noted by other experts: 
Drizin and Leo explained the young persons’ vulnerabilities 
in terms of being less mature and having had less life 
experience than older suspects, leaving them feeling more 
intimidated and coerced and less able to cope with the 
demand characteristic of the police interrogation. The 
younger the person, the greater the likelihood that he/she will 
waive their rights to legal advice and give a false 
confession.200 
Ultimately, the fundamental brain differences between juveniles and 
adults place juveniles at a significant disadvantage in criminal 
interrogations.201 Thus, given that juveniles face a greater 
vulnerability to police coercion and yet are subjected to adult 
interrogation techniques, it is no surprise that children falsely confess. 
B.  False Confession Rates 
The exposure to sophisticated psychological techniques of 
interrogation, in turn, has produced an unacceptably high number of 
false confessions. According to FalseConfessions.org, of the two 
million men and women imprisoned in the United States, as estimated 
by the Department of Justice, “as many as 50,000 involved false 
confessions.”202 Further, 63 percent of known false confessors were 
under the age of twenty-five, and 32 percent were under the age of 
eighteen.203 Of those under eighteen years old, 16 percent were 
juveniles arrested for murder and rape.204 Another study established 
that 42 percent of juvenile exonerations involved false confessions in 
comparison to only 13 percent of adult exonerations.205 Today, 
juveniles “are over-represented” in false confessions, which 
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“suggest[s] that children . . . may be especially vulnerable to the 
pressures of interrogation and the possibility of false confession.”206 
C.  No Specific Rules Exist for Questioning Juveniles 
Despite the alarming rate of false confessions, the Supreme Court 
has failed to proscribe special procedures for juvenile interrogations 
beyond those delineated in J.D.B. v. North Carolina.207 States are 
afforded great freedom to determine their own rules for interrogating 
juveniles.208 
For example, several states, including California, have no rules 
requiring the police to notify the parents of a juvenile when their child 
is being questioned.209 The police are required to read juveniles the 
Miranda warnings at the time of arrest though if the juvenile is 
arrested.210 If the officers do not question a juvenile again for several 
hours, they are not required to repeat the Miranda warnings to the 
juvenile.211 
The mounting evidence and research on child brain development 
indicates that more reform is needed to protect the constitutional rights 
of children during the police investigation stage. More specifically, 
reform in police interrogation techniques and the development of new 
juvenile Miranda warnings is wholly overdue. 
VIII.  MODIFIED MIRANDA WARNINGS FOR CHILDREN 
To improve children’s comprehension of their constitutional 
rights, the following modified Miranda warnings are suggested: 
A.  Children’s Miranda Warnings 
1. You have the right to remain silent. This means you do not 
have to say anything or answer my questions or any other 
officer’s questions. 
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2. Anything you say may be used against you. This means what 
you say can be used against you in juvenile court or, if 
charged as an adult, in adult court. This means what you say 
can get you in serious trouble. 
3. Before and during all questioning, you may have your parent 
or guardian present and may talk privately with your parent 
or guardian. This means before you say anything to us or at 
any time during our conversation, you may talk with your 
parent or guardian. 
4. You or your parent or guardian may talk to an attorney, free 
of charge, before talking to us. 
5. You or your parent or guardian may stop the interview at any 
time. 
6. You or your parent or guardian may, at any time, have an 
attorney with you during questioning for free. 
Do you want to talk to your parent or guardian? 
Do you want to have an attorney present? 
Do you want to talk to us? 
Miranda warnings are only effective if those warnings are fully 
understood. To advance the understanding of their rights, a Children’s 
Bill of Rights is proposed: 
B.  Children’s Bill of Rights 
1. A child shall have the same constitutional rights as an adult. 
2. A child has the right to be advised of his or her Miranda rights 
when detained and questioned, in a manner suited to the 
child’s intellectual development. 
3. A child shall have present, before and during any questioning, 
a parent or guardian or legal caregiver (“custodial parent”) 
who shall exercise the child’s Miranda rights in the best legal 
interest of the child. 
4. A request by a child to talk to a custodial parent shall 
constitute the invocation of the child’s Miranda right to 
remain silent. 
5. No child or custodial parent shall waive the Miranda rights of 
a child fourteen years or younger without first talking to an 
attorney, who must agree that the child’s Miranda rights may 
be waived. 
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6. A child fifteen years or older may waive his or her Miranda 
rights only after the child and the child’s custodial parent 
consult with an attorney. 
7. If the child or the child’s custodial parent cannot afford an 
attorney, one shall be provided at no cost before the child is 
questioned. 
8. The child, the child’s custodial parent, and the child’s attorney 
shall be advised of the nature of the matter being investigated 
and why the child is being questioned. 
9. When the custodial parent is suspected of committing a crime, 
an attorney shall be provided, at no cost, to represent and 
advise the child regarding the child’s Miranda rights, and the 
attorney shall be present during questioning of the child. 
10. If the child is suspected of a criminal offense, the child’s 
attorney shall advise the child and the child’s custodial parent 
that the child may be charged as a juvenile offender subject to 
detention and rehabilitation under juvenile law, or, when 
allowed by law, charged and sentenced as an adult, including 
a sentence of life in prison. 
11. All questioning of a child who has been detained shall be 
video recorded. The recording shall be preserved for use in a 
court of law irrespective of whether the child is charged with 
a criminal offense. 
12. A child shall not be questioned for more than four hours in a 
twenty-four-hour period and shall be allowed to eat and rest 
for eight hours between periods of questioning. 
IX.  CONCLUSION 
While the United States Supreme Court and lower court rulings 
acknowledge juveniles are a susceptible class of the population that 
warrant unique safeguards, the constitutional rights of children in the 
investigatory stage of criminal cases are wholly deficient. The 
proposed modified Miranda warnings will assist youths in better 
understanding their constitutional rights. However, given the 
sophisticated techniques used by today’s police and the vulnerability 
of juveniles to adult authority, more is needed to ensure that children 
know the consequences of waiving their rights. 
The reliance on parental or guardian advice raises problematic 
issues when the interests of the custodial adult do not coincide with 
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those of the juvenile. Further, few adults understand the consequences 
of waiving Miranda rights, and can themselves be subject to 
persuasive tactics by the police, resulting in the parent telling the child 
to cooperate with the police. Thus, there is a need to ensure juveniles 
are provided conflict-free support and appropriate legal advice. To this 
end, the Children’s Bill of Rights offers protection presently not 
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